Keir Starmer’s arrival in Beijing marks the first visit by a British leader since Theresa May in 2018. In the intervening years, the UK has cycled through seven foreign secretaries and five prime ministers – a revolving door of leadership that has left British policy toward China fractured and inconsistent.

The Labour government has signalled a desire for warmer relations since taking office, banking that diplomatic stability will yield economic rewards. Yet the same governmental restraints will continue to exist: the business department views China as an opportunity, while those in defence view it as a risk. Previous flashpoints around Chinese investments with nuclear plant Sizewell C and the use of Huawei’s 5G technologies illustrate the tricky trade offs at play. 

But what many commenters fail to appreciate is that in the corridors of Zhongnanhai, Britain is no longer a top priority. Beijing’s strategic focus is consumed by the United States, followed by Russia, Japan and the European Union. Beijing views Britain as just one of many medium-sized powers to be managed. The political capital required for Britain to substantially influence China’s trajectory has largely evaporated.

Despite this evident power dynamic, Britain remains worth influencing. China’s ongoing espionage efforts and its successful push for a London “super-embassy” demonstrate that the UK is still a critical node in the Western alliance. For Beijing, Starmer’s visit is not a bilateral reset between equals; it is one piece of a larger puzzle aimed at coaxing Western nations into a more Sinocentric orbit. It follows the recent visit by Canada’s Mark Carney and sets the stage for German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s arrival next month.

Britain must trade the illusions of the past for a dose of realism. Despite the 50 British C-suite executives accompanying Starmer, there are no easy wins to be had, and any potential gains will likely be modest. Whatever the diplomatic outcome, the priority must remain domestic: building the structural resilience necessary to shield British interests from the inevitable risks of deeper engagement.

In Mandarin, the idiom ruorou qiangshi (弱肉強食) describes a world where the weak are prey to the strong. In this new era of geopolitics, the best Britain can hope for is not a golden era, but a disciplined, predictable friction.