China has quickly achieved global power status in space, but the
costs of financing its bold plans may require trade-offs

In November last year, three astronauts landed in China’s Tiangong space station, a pivotal milestone for a country with long-term ambitions for space.

Tiangong, which translates into English as ‘Heavenly Palace’, is China’s new permanent space station and follows on from the previous prototypes Tiangong-1 and Tiangong-2.

Launched in July, the station is a powerful illustration of the progress Beijing has made in implementing the ‘Third Step’ of the China Manned Space Programme, originally created by the China Manned Space Agency in 1992 to develop and enhance human spaceflight capabilities.

The ‘First Step’ involved a crewed spacecraft launching and returning, which was completed in October 2003 when Yang Liwei safely landed in central Inner Mongolia. The ‘Second Step’ was split into two phases, the first involved making technological progress in extravehicular activities, space rendezvous and docking to help support human activities in space. The second phase saw the launch of four space laboratory missions, which included the launch of Tiangong-1 and Tiangong-2.

China’s space ambitions do not stop here. Their aim is to become a leading space power by 2045, with six key objectives set in place between then and now, which include landing astronauts on the moon by 2030 and building a nuclear-powered space shuttle by 2040.

Beijing has several aims for wanting to expand their presence within the space sector, not least that of legitimacy and prestige. China’s century of humiliation, bainian guochi in Chinese, forms a key part of the Communist Party’s narrative. The period from 1839 to 1949, which began with the first Opium War, resulted in the Qing dynasty and later the Republic of China being subjugated to unfair treaties by Western powers and Japan.

This humiliation formed a key part of the Party’s story of national rejuvenation, a narrative in which only the Party can return China back to its rightful place as one of the world’s most important civilisations. A thriving space sector offers China the status and respect it has been yearning for on the international stage.

But there is more than simply prestige driving China’s ambitions. The commercial value of the space sector is worth $400 billion dollars globally and continuously growing. Satellites are crucial to our communication and navigation infrastructure, and there is growing demand for earth observation technology.

The pace of technological development within the sector presents new challenges for policymakers to address. Dual use of this technology makes distinguishing between military and non-military functions very difficult, and there is growing concern that a lack of rules and regulations within space will lead to difficult diplomatic disputes.

Russia’s attack on the Cosmos 1408 satellite illustrates how a rules-based order is desperately needed, both to prevent erratic behaviour within space but also to reduce the amount of space debris in orbit. NASA states that the space around Earth is currently littered with roughly 9,000 metric tonnes of debris, a huge risk to the vast amounts of satellites in operation.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the U.S.’ attempt to implement a set of rules through the Artemis Accords fell on deaf ears. But as a growing space power, Beijing will need to play a leading role in any future discussions of space governance.

Progress on the responsible and sustainable exploration of outer space can only be achieved if China, Russia and the U.S. collectively agree to a new set of rules.

China’s expansion within space is highly dependent on their economic growth. The Chinese economy is suffering from a string of systemic issues including rising youth unemployment, an unstable housing market and the difficulties of transitioning away from its zero covid policy, which has stifled economic activity and disrupted global supply chains.

China has ambitious plans for space but its ability to implement its space strategy will depend on its ability to finance its space projects. Beijing will have to face uncomfortable trade-offs on questions of expenditure. How high its space sector ranks within the hierarchy of competing policy objectives remains to be seen.

Beijing has several aims for wanting to expand their presence within the space sector, not least that of legitimacy and prestige. China’s century of humiliation, bainian guochi in Chinese, forms a key part of the Communist Party’s narrative. The period from 1839 to 1949, which began with the first Opium War, resulted in the Qing dynasty and later the Republic of China being subjugated to unfair treaties by Western powers and Japan.

This humiliation formed a key part of the Party’s story of national rejuvenation, a narrative in which only the Party can return China back to its rightful place as one of the world’s most important civilisations. A thriving space sector offers China the status and respect it has been yearning for on the international stage.

But there is more than simply prestige driving China’s ambitions. The commercial value of the space sector is worth $400 billion dollars globally and continuously growing. Satellites are crucial to our communication and navigation infrastructure, and there is growing demand for earth observation technology.

The pace of technological development within the sector presents new challenges for policymakers to address. Dual use of this technology makes distinguishing between military and non-military functions very difficult, and there is growing concern that a lack of rules and regulations within space will lead to difficult diplomatic disputes.

Russia’s attack on the Cosmos 1408 satellite illustrates how a rules-based order is desperately needed, both to prevent erratic behaviour within space but also to reduce the amount of space debris in orbit. NASA states that the space around Earth is currently littered with roughly 9,000 metric tonnes of debris, a huge risk to the vast amounts of satellites in operation.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the U.S.’ attempt to implement a set of rules through the Artemis Accords fell on deaf ears. But as a growing space power, Beijing will need to play a leading role in any future discussions of space governance.

Progress on the responsible and sustainable exploration of outer space can only be achieved if China, Russia and the U.S. collectively agree to a new set of rules.

China’s expansion within space is highly dependent on their economic growth. The Chinese economy is suffering from a string of systemic issues including rising youth unemployment, an unstable housing market and the difficulties of transitioning away from its zero covid policy, which has stifled economic activity and disrupted global supply chains.

China has ambitious plans for space but its ability to implement its space strategy will depend on its ability to finance its space projects. Beijing will have to face uncomfortable trade-offs on questions of expenditure. How high its space sector ranks within the hierarchy of competing policy objectives remains to be seen.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the U.S.’ attempt to implement a set of rules through the Artemis Accords fell on deaf ears. But as a growing space power, Beijing will need to play a leading role in any future discussions of space governance.

Progress on the responsible and sustainable exploration of outer space can only be achieved if China, Russia and the U.S. collectively agree to a new set of rules.

China’s expansion within space is highly dependent on their economic growth. The Chinese economy is suffering from a string of systemic issues including rising youth unemployment, an unstable housing market and the difficulties of transitioning away from its zero covid policy, which has stifled economic activity and disrupted global supply chains.

China has ambitious plans for space but its ability to implement its space strategy will depend on its ability to finance its space projects. Beijing will have to face uncomfortable trade-offs on questions of expenditure. How high its space sector ranks within the hierarchy of competing policy objectives remains to be seen.